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ABSTRACT 
THE HINDSIGHT BIAS: JUDGMENT TASK DIFFERENTIATION 
Ross William May 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Director: Dr. Ivan K. Ash 
Recent hindsight bias research suggests that modern Cognitive Reconstruction 
theories that model hindsight effects as non-unitary phenomena potentially confound 
their findings by not differentiating between judgment tasks. This experiment tests a non-
unitary approach of modeling hindsight effects that predicts confidence ratings and 
outcome likelihood judgments to be independent tasks, governed by differing cognitive 
processes and susceptible to unique patterns of hindsight bias. Predictions specify that 
sense-making theories accurately account for hindsight bias effects for outcome 
likelihood ratings and expectation based adjustment models accurately account for "I 
would have known that!" hindsight bias effects for confidence ratings. Utilizing a within-
subjects, narrative text paradigm, the proposed non-unitary approach was tested by 
investigating whether the effects of outcome congruency on hindsight bias results were 
moderated by the type of judgment task. Participants read stories, rated their confidence 
in predicting the outcome or the likelihood of possible outcomes, given either expected or 
unexpected story outcomes, and then asked to recall their ratings. Results supported the 
predictions of the proposed non-unitary approach with confidence ratings and outcome 
likelihood judgments producing opposite patterns of hindsight bias effects. Theoretical 
implications, study limitations and future research directions were also discussed. 
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In one of the earliest hindsight bias investigations, Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) 
had participants attempt to recall the beliefs they held in the past before receiving 
outcome feedback. First, participants judged the probability of different outcomes of 
Nixon's then upcoming political trips to Moscow and Peking. Then after the trips, the 
participants were told the political outcomes of the trips and were asked to recall the 
probabilities they had earlier assigned to the outcomes. Results revealed that remembered 
probabilities were biased in favor of the actual outcomes. In other words participants 
"remembered" having given higher probabilities to events that actually occurred and 
lower probabilities to events that did not occur, hence the "hindsight bias". 
In the last 30 years, the "hindsight bias" has become one of the most frequently 
cited judgment biases. The bias began receiving attention when Fischhoff (1975) 
published his seminal hindsight paper and research has since lead to two meta-analytic 
reviews (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway & 
Posavac, 2004), five substantive theoretical reviews (Blank, Nestler, von Collani & 
Fischer, 2008; Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Hoflrage & Pohl, 
2003; Stahlberg & Maass, 1998) and two journal special issues (Memory, 2003; Social 
Cognition, 2007), revealing the bias to be robust across a wide variety of situations, 
domains, and task environments and influencing processes involved in learning, memory 
storage, memory retrieval, and judgment formation (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). 
Furthermore, the appearance of this bias in many "real life" situations, such as stock 
purchases, jurors' decisions and medical diagnoses indicates that research into this 
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phenomenon has several practical implications (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 
1991). Due to the ubiquity and real-world occurrence of this bias, the goal of proposing 
and evaluating theoretical explanations for the hindsight bias phenomenon is important 
for both scientific and applied purposes. 
To date, Cognitive Reconstruction (CR) theories have provided the most plausible 
explanation of the hindsight bias (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, 
Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990, Stahlberg & Maass, 
1998). CR theories claim that individuals do not directly access a memory of their 
predictive judgments when making retrospective judgments. Instead, individuals either 
rejudge the current situation or estimate the initial decision in an attempt to reconstruct 
the initial judgment. Therefore, CR theories propose that the exposure to outcome 
information influences the reconstruction process and leads the person to overestimate 
their predictive accuracy. In this context, the hindsight bias can be defined as the 
descriptive account of the systematic difference between people's predictive and 
retrospective judgments (Ash, 2009). 
However, specific methodological concerns and empirical inconsistencies in the 
hindsight literature have lead to questions of the adequacy of CR theories to thoroughly 
and accuracy model the hindsight bias. First, in attempting to explain the specific nature 
of the cognitive mechanism(s) responsible for eliciting hindsight, the literature reveals a 
host of competing CR theories that propose different types of judgment reconstruction 
mechanisms (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Second, research attempting to "de-bias" the 
hindsight bias based on these CR theories have lead to inconsistent results (Guilbault et 
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al., 2004). Lastly, the research attempting to predict individual differences based on these 
CR theories has been largely unsuccessful (Musch & Wagner, 2007). 
These issues have raised fundamental questions concerning the cognitive 
mechanisms involved in retrospective judgment making and if the hindsight bias is a 
unitary phenomenon (Ash, 2009; Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008). It has 
been proposed that some of the opposing hindsight predictions made by different CR 
theories and many of the conflicting results in the literature may be a symptom of 
researchers foiling to separate judgment tasks according to the unique cognitive processes 
specific to each judgment task (Ash, 2009; Ash & Wiley, 2008). The current study 
investigated whether the different judgment tasks predominantly used in contemporary 
hindsight bias research trigger different cognitive mechanisms within the judgment 
formation process. Specifically, the study examined whether judgments of the likelihood 
of possible outcomes to situations and metacognitive assessments of confidence in the 
predictions rely on different cues and mental representations which lead to the activation 
of different judgment formation processes. Due to these task and processing differences, 
the theories required to explain the pattern of hindsight bias must be unique to each 
judgment task. 
The goal of the current investigation is to provide support of a new approach in 
modeling hindsight effects that is designed to eliminate confounded hindsight findings 
due to the lack of judgment task differentiation. In the following sections, I first introduce 
CR theories of the hindsight bias and discuss unitary and non-unitary hindsight bias 
models. Then I discuss the differences between the two types of judgment tasks that are 
commonly used in hindsight bias research and the implications of modeling hindsight 
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findings for these different tasks in accordance with unitary and non-unitary models. This 
is followed by a discussion of how outcome congruency manipulations can be used to test 
different unitary and non-unitary theories of the hindsight bias. Finally, I report findings 
of an experiment that tested differential unitary and non-unitary model predictions of 
hindsight bias patterns. Using a scenario based, within-subjects hindsight bias paradigm, 
the experiment tested whether the effects of outcome congruency on hindsight bias 
patterns were moderated by judgment task. Support is found for non-unitary models with 
findings providing evidence for modeling hindsight effects separately for each judgment 
task. 
Unitary Cognitive Reconstruction Theories 
Cognitive reconstruction (CR) theories of the hindsight bias generally propose 
that exposure to outcome information biases retrospective judgment making toward the 
given outcome. Therefore, when trying to recreate their initial predictive judgment, 
individuals tend to overestimate their predictive accuracy thus creating the hindsight bias. 
Several CR models have been developed that propose differing cognitive processes to 
explain exactly how people reconstruct their prior judgments. In categorizing similarities 
between these models, Hawkins and Hastie (1990) differentiated between two general 
classes of CR theories that utilize different reconstructive processes to explain hindsight 
effects: the Anchoring and Adjustment theories and the Updating and Rejudging theories. 
Anchoring and Adjustment theories propose that people attempt to reconstruct 
their predictive judgment by using outcome information as an anchor and then adjust 
their retrospective estimate from the given outcome by using some metacognitive or 
experiential cue. (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Ofir & 
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Mazursky, 1990; Sanna & Schwarz, 2007; Schkade & Kilbourne, 1991; Schwarz & 
Stahlberg, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Werth & Strack, 2003; Werth, Strack, & 
Forster, 2002). Hindsight effects occur because people, when trying to make plausible 
estimates, are generally overly optimistic in their predictive abilities and therefore make 
insufficient adjustments during retrospection. Thus, hindsight effects result from people's 
inability to appropriately utilize subjective cues in reconstructing predictive judgments. 
Updating and Rejudging theories propose that exposure to outcome information 
affects people's representation and mental model of the situation, which leads to a new 
and updated representation. Individuals then make their retrospective judgments by 
rejudging the situation using their current mental representation. However, since this 
representation has been affected by outcome information, people's retrospective 
judgments tend to be biased in favor of the given outcome (Ash, 2009; Blank & Nestler, 
2007; Nestler, Blank, & von Collani, 2008a, 2008b; Carli, 1999; Fischhoff, 1975; Hasher, 
Attig, & Alba, 1981; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000; 
Pohl, Eisenhauer, & Hardt, 2003; Pezzo, 2003; Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007; Roese & Olson, 
1996; Schkade & Kilbourne, 1991). 
Ash (2009) then further specified two unique types of reconstruction processes 
that have been proposed within each general CR class. Within the Anchoring and 
Adjustment theories two different adjustment mechanism were proposed; the 
expectation-based adjustment mechanism and the experience-based adjustment 
mechanism. Likewise, two different updating mechanisms were proposed within the 
Updating and Rejudging theories: the automatic assimilation mechanism and the sense-
making mechanism. 
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Theories proposing an expectation-based adjustment mechanism propose that 
people attempt to use "surprise" as a cue in evaluating how different the outcome 
information is from whatever they previously knew about the event and the judgment 
(Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Ofir & Mazursky, 1990; Sanna & Schwarz, 2007). By using 
the cue of how "surprising" they found the given outcome, people adjust their 
retrospective judgment using this subjective information. For example, if a person recalls 
that the outcome was expected then it will lead to an "I would have known that" feeling. 
This feeling will cause the person to make only a small adjustment from the 100% 
likelihood anchor, which often leads to an overestimation of predictive accuracy 
(hindsight bias). However, if a person feels that the outcome was surprising then it will 
lead to an "I would have never known that" feeling. This subjective feeling will cause a 
larger adjustment and lead to retrospective judgments that do not as greatly overestimate 
predictive accuracy, thereby lessening the hindsight bias effect. Furthermore, in situations 
that are highly surprising the adjustment may even lead to an underestimation of 
predictive accuracy and cause a "reverse" hindsight bias effect. 
Theories advancing an experience-based adjustment mechanism propose that 
people generally do not remember or recall their original judgment and, at retrospection, 
use outcome information as an anchor in reconstructing their original judgment. 
Adjustment from this anchor when producing a retrospective judgment is based upon 
experiential beliefs. The magnitude and direction of the hindsight effect then depends on 
people's subjective assumption about their confidence in their predictive ability or beliefs 
about their expertise in the judgment domain (Schwarz & Stahlberg, 2003; Werth & 
Strack, 2003; Werth, Strack, & Forster, 2002). These theories propose that people are 
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generally overly optimistic about their knowledge in a judgment domain or overly 
confident in their predictive accuracy and therefore endorse that their prior estimate was 
closer to the given outcome than their original estimation actually indicated (producing a 
hindsight bias). However, if people felt that the outcome was unpredictable or lacked 
knowledge about the judgment domain, then a larger adjustment would be made thus 
reducing, reversing, or eliminating the hindsight bias. 
Automatic assimilation theories propose that people use the same type of 
judgment process to make both the predictive and the retrospective judgments (Carli, 
1999; FischhofF, 1975; Hasher, Attig, & Alba, 1981; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Hoffrage 
et al., 2000; Pohl et al., 2003). Generally, it is proposed that people make predictive 
judgments based on the amount of outcome supporting information accessible in their 
mental representation of the situation. Outcomes that have more accessible supporting 
information are judged as more likely, while outcomes that have less accessible 
supporting information are judged as less likely. During retrospection, people simply 
rejudge the situation using the same process used to formulate their predictive judgment. 
However, at retrospection, outcome information has been assimilated or integrated into 
their representation of the situation. This assimilation process renders the outcome-
supporting information more accessible in memory. Therefore, when making 
retrospective judgments, people are rejudging the likelihood of the potential outcomes 
using an updated mental representation that fevors the given outcome. 
Sense-making theories propose a "sense-making" or a "causal reasoning" process 
responsible for producing hindsight effects (Ash, 2009; Blank & Nestler, 2007; Nestler, 
Blank, & von Collani, 2008a, 2008b; Pezzo, 2003; Pezzo & Beckstead, 2008; Pezzo & 
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Pezzo, 2007; Roese & Olson, 1996; Schkade & Kilbourne, 1991). Sense-making has been 
conceptualized as a set of motivated problem-solving cognitions that occur during the 
comprehension, interpretation, solution, and explanation of an event (Anderson, Krull, & 
Weiner, 1996). The process of "sense-making" then is the search for potential 
explanations, or causes, that suitably support the occurrence of a particular outcome. In 
general, these theories postulate that people will only update their knowledge or beliefs 
when their current representation of the situation is incongruent with the given outcome. 
These theories propose that incongruent outcome information activates "sense-making" 
mechanisms. Successful sense-making will lead to an updated representation of the 
situation that is more in line with the outcome information. This updating of the problem 
representation occurs only in situations where the given outcome information does not fit 
coherently, and thus does not make sense, with the pre-outcome information. Greater 
hindsight bias effects are then produced following incongruent outcomes in contrast to 
more congruent outcomes. Two research camps have produced comprehensive sense-
making models, Blank and Nestler (2007; Nestler, Blank, & von Collani, 2008a; 2008b) 
and Ash (2009). 
Non-Unitary Cognitive Reconstruction Theories 
In addition to the unitary hindsight CR theories, there is a growing consensus in 
the literature that "the hindsight bias" is not a singular phenomenon (see Blank, Nestler, 
von Collani, & Fischer, 2008; Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Hoffrage, 1997; Kelman, Fallas, & 
Folger, 1998). In an effort to move the conceptualization of "hindsight bias" away from a 
singular and unitary view, these CR theories decompose the "hindsight experience" into 
separate and unique sub-phenomena. These multifaceted, non-unitary theories attempt to 
9 
account for the different "hindsight experiences" by breaking down the hindsight bias 
into separate experiences, processes, or components. Recent advancements in this non-
unitary view of hindsight bias have been made by Pezzo and Pezzo's (2007) Motivated 
Sense-Making Model, Mttller & Stahlberg's (2007) Dual-Process Model, and Blank, 
Nestler, von Collani, and Fischer's (2008) Separate Components View (2008). 
According to Pezzo and Pezzo's (2007) Motivated Sense-Making Model, 
hindsight bias is the result of two distinct processes: sense-making and defensive 
processing. Unexpectedly negative and self-relevant outcomes typically trigger a search 
(the sense-making process) for external, but not internal causes for the outcome. This 
sense-making process is activated when outcome information is inconsistent with prior 
knowledge. Successful sense-making (finding an acceptable external cause for the 
outcome) leaves people with an updated representation of the situation that favors the 
given outcome. On retrospective judgments, people use this updated representation to 
reconstruct their predictive judgment, which leads to the hindsight bias. A failure to 
uncover external causes often results in defensive processing. 
Defensive processing is activated when judgments are made in a self-relevant 
domain (i.e. situations where outcomes have positive or negative impacts on the person 
making the judgment). In these domains, negative outcomes will cause people to 
discount or ignore the outcome in order to protect their self-esteem In doing so, a more 
accurate assessment of their predictive judgment is facilitated, attenuating hindsight bias 
effects. However, in some instances, internal causes may be so undeniable that 
responsibility is accepted for the negative outcome and the hindsight bias results. 
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Blank, Nestler, von Collani, and Fischer's Separate Components View (2008) 
argues that within the hindsight bias literature there are three different hindsight bias 
experiences that emerge: memory distortion experiences, impressions of foreseeability, 
and impressions of necessity. Memory distorting experiences refer to hindsight effects in 
which, after having received feedback about the outcome of an event or the answer to a 
factual knowledge question, people's recollections of their own prior judgments are 
biased in favor of the direction of the feedback. The impression of foreseeability 
describes the tendency for people to believe they would have been able to predict, or that 
they knew all along, how an event would conclude. Impressions of necessity refer to 
hindsight effects where, once the outcome is known, the probably of event outcomes are 
perceived as more necessary and inevitable (more probable) in hindsight than in 
foresight. 
Furthermore, the authors claim that these three different hindsight components 
(experiences) are distinguished from each other by differing qualities of four features; the 
entities the components refer to (entity), the content or object (content), the psychological 
process (process), and the functions they serve the individual (function). Notably, the 
authors hold that the each component is driven by a distinct psychological process. They 
suggest that causal attribution is the main process underlying necessity impressions, 
foreseeability is driven by metacognitive considerations, and memory distortions are 
elicited through the memory processes of anchoring on the outcome and reconstructing 
one's initial prediction from the anchor. 
The Dual-Processes Model of hindsight bias proposed by Mtiller and Stahlberg 
(2007) was aimed at addressing some of the contradicting predictions and results 
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regarding the role of surprise in hindsight bias effects. This model attributes hindsight 
differences as a combination of the activation of sense-making processes and 
expectation-based anchoring and adjustment processes. The dual process model suggests 
that the subjective feeling of surprise influences hindsight effects through two different 
routes. First, it is proposed that surprise can be used as a heuristic cue in the 
reconstruction of pre-outcome predictions. In this sense, the feeling of surprise alerts one 
to an inaccurate or unpredicted outcome. Secondly, it is proposed that surprise can also 
act as a trigger to elicit a biased sense-making process when a certain "surprise" threshold 
is reached. 
Hindsight effects are then determined by the activation and utilization of these 
two processes, which are influenced by both motivational levels and/or cognitive load 
capacity. This model posits that in high motivation or low cognitive load situations, 
surprising outcomes should be likely to activate resource demanding sense-making 
processes. However, in low motivation or high cognitive load situations, simpler and 
more automatic surprise-based heuristic adjustment mechanisms would be activated. Due 
to these differing reconstruction mechanisms, opposite hindsight bias patterns are 
expected to be observed under differing motivational situations or cognitive load 
constraints. Specifically, the sense-making processes would lead to hindsight bias only 
for surprising or unexpected outcomes, because these are the types of situations which 
would activate sense-making. The expectation based anchor and adjust mechanisms 
would only lead to hindsight bias on unsurprising or expected outcomes. In these 
situations people exhibit the metacognitive "I would have known that!" feeling that leads 
to under adjustment from the overconfidence in their predictive judgment ability. 
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While these non-unitary models have made contributions to the notion that the 
"hindsight bias" phenomena may be caused or determined by multiple cognitive 
processes, they have not proposed that differences in judgment tasks may result in 
different patterns of hindsight findings. Again, I propose that some of the opposing 
predictions and conflicting findings in the literature may be a symptom of researchers 
failing to separate judgment choices according to the cognitive processes that are specific 
to each judgment task. Next, I discuss the differences between the two types of judgment 
tasks that are commonly used in hindsight bias research and the implications of modeling 
hindsight findings for these different tasks in accordance with unitary and non-unitary 
models. 
Judgment Tasks 
Two main types of judgment tasks used to investigate the hindsight bias are 
situational judgment tasks and metacognitive assessments (Ash & Wiley, 2008; 
Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway & Posavac, 2004; 
Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Hoffrage & Pohl, 2003; Pohl, 2007). Both of these judgment 
tasks are designed to provide laboratory models of frequently occurring real-life 
judgments were the occurrence of the hindsight bias may have severe detrimental effects 
(Fischhoff, 2007; Louie, Rajon, & Sibley, 2007). As examples of these detrimental 
effects, inaccurate retrospective judgment processes have been shown to occur in stock 
purchases (Louie, 1999), political decisions (Blank, Nestler, von Collani & Fischer, 
2008), juror's decisions (Casper, Benedict, & Perry, 1989), victim degradation (Carli, 
1999), as well as healthcare and medical decisions (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 
1988; Bo rum, Otto, & Golding, 1993). By understanding how retrospective judgments 
are constructed, better interventions can be developed to help prevent the harmful effects 
of the hindsight bias. 
Situational judgment tasks commonly assess outcome likelihood predictions. 
Outcome likelihood predictions involve asking participants to predict the likelihood of 
the outcome of an event or situation. As an example, participants would first be presented 
a narrative story or a description of some situation. They then would be asked to predict 
the probability of different outcomes to the event or situation. For example, Ash (2009) 
presented this question prompt to participants after they read a narrative of a tennis match 
between two players: "Either Mark Krause won the match OR Nathan Mitchell won the 
match. Use the scale below to indicate your opinion of how likely the two outcomes are 
based on the story." After this predictive judgment phase, feedback consisting of either 
the conclusion to the story or a description of the "true" outcome of the event would be 
given to the participants (i.e. Mark Krause won). Hindsight bias on outcome likelihood 
judgments is then evidenced by higher retrospective likelihood ratings for the given 
outcome. 
Metacognition refers to "cognition about cognitive phenomena" (Flavell, 1979). 
In hindsight bias paradigms, metacognitive assessments would include any task that asks 
people to assess the nature of their own memory, knowledge, skill, abilities, or expertise 
(Ash & Wiley, 2008). A primary type of metacognitive judgment that has been used in 
hindsight bias research is a confidence rating. Confidence judgments usually use trivia 
problems to ask participants to assess the likelihood they are correct after selecting a 
response or choosing an answer (e.g. Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000; Which 
food do you think has more cholesterol, chocolate fudge cake or pie? How confident are 
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you that your choice is correct?). The feedback in these tasks consists of either being 
given the correct answer to the question or being given feedback about the accuracy of 
one's own response. 
Confounding of Judgment Task on the Hindsight Bias. 
It can be argued that situational (likelihood) judgments and metacognitive 
(confidence) assessments involve fundamentally different cognitive processes during the 
problem representation and judgment formation processes (Ash, 2009; Ash & Wiley, 
2008; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). It seems then that a major part of the theoretical 
confusion as to whether the hindsight effect is a unitary or non-unitary phenomenon 
stems from researcher not differentiating between judgment tasks. Results that may seem 
inconsistent or conflicting in the literature may be due to the feet that researchers are 
assuming a unitary explanation for the hindsight bias across judgment tasks. However, if 
we assume that these different types of judgment tasks involved different reconstruction 
processes, then we would expect different variables and manipulations to have different 
effects on hindsight bias. 
Differences between situational judgments and metacognitive assessments have 
already appeared in the problem solving and comprehension literatures. In regards to 
situational judgments, much work has already been done in the area of how people 
construct, integrate, store, and update narrative information and it has been proposed that 
the formation of a mental problem representation relies on the same cognitive processes 
as the comprehension of events, situations, or texts (Kintsch, 1988,1998; Trabasso & 
Wiley, 2005). As narrative texts serve as the problem stimuli for situational judgments, 
construction integration models of text representations therefore seem to be more than 
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adequate in explaining how mental representations of situational judgments are formed. 
Generally, narrative comprehension theories contend that new information is entered into 
a representation and connected with preexisting information already in memory. The 
integration of new information into memory updates the "accessibility" of information, 
thus changing the connection strength between information units. New information is 
proposed to be connected or integrated into an ongoing representation by either 
"resonance" mechanisms (Kintsch, 1998; Myers & O'Brien, 1998) or through the 
changes based on causal relationships (Langston & Trabasso, 1999; Langston, Trabasso, 
& Magliano, 1998; Trabasso & Bartolone, 2003; Trabasso & Wiley, 2005; Trabasso & 
van den Broek, 1985). Regardless of the mechanism, prior information that is connected 
to the new information increases the relative accessibility of those connected information 
units to a greater degree than information unit pairs that are not connected. 
Unfortunately, less is known about how metacognitive assessment cues are 
represented in memory. Van Overschede (2008) contends that most investigations into 
metacognitive assessments focus on one's interpretation or assessment of the accessibility 
of the metacognitive cues while neglecting the actually representational structure of the 
cue influencing these assessments. He notes that the structure of the knowledge base of 
the cue, which provides the foundation for true metacognitive decision, has "been 
underemphasized in metacognitive research and theory" and that future research is 
needed to compensate for this error (Van Overschelde, 2008, p. 65). However, both the 
expectation and experience based adjustment mechanisms within the anchoring and 
adjustment hindsight theories have been shown to successfully account for hindsight bias 
effects in these types of judgments (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Ofir & Mazursky, 1990; 
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1997; Sanna & Schwarz, 2007; Schwarz & Stahlberg, 2003; Werth & Strack, 2003; 
Werth, Strack, & Forster, 2002). 
Judgment Task Differentiation 
Ash and Wiley (2008) and Ash (2009) have proposed a non-unitary approach to 
modeling the hindsight bias that differentiated between judgment tasks based on how 
mental representations influence the judgment formation and reconstruction processes. In 
Ash and Wiley (2008), they proposed that the judgment reconstruction processes 
described by Anchor and Adjustment theories might provide a plausible explanation for 
hindsight bias effects on metacognitive assessments because these judgments use the 
types of metacognitive cues (i.e. domain self-efficacy or feeling of knowing) described in 
the expectation and experience based adjustment models. They also proposed that the 
judgment reconstruction processes described by Updating & Rejudging theories might 
provide a plausible explanation for the hindsight bias for situational judgments used in 
narrative text paradigms. They proposed that these judgment tasks require people to form 
a mental representation of the novel situation described in the narrative text and that the 
judgments depend on the information available in one's mental representation. In line 
with their predictions, using multi-component mathematical and insight problems in a 
within-subjects hindsight bias paradigm, they found different patterns of hindsight bias 
on metacognitive judgments (people's confidence in their ability of solving a problem) 
and situational judgments (people's assessment of the importance of the different 
components of a problem) depending on the type of problem, availability of feedback, 
and solution success. 
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Furthermore, Ash (2009) found that sense making theories within the Updating 
and Rejudging CR class best described hindsight results on situational judgments. Using 
a narrative text paradigm, Ash investigated the influence of surprise (manipulated by the 
congruency between pre-outcome information and outcome information) on the hindsight 
bias of event-likelihood ratings (situational judgments). Results indicated that the 
hindsight bias did not occur in situations where the given outcome was congruent with 
the majority of outcome supporting information presented in the narrative. The hindsight 
bias only occurred in situations where the initial representation was ambivalent to or 
incongruent with the given outcome, supporting the idea that active sense-making 
processes are involved in the process of updating the problem representation during 
retrospective judgment making for situational judgment domains. Additionally, Nester 
and Egloff (2009) also provided support that sense-making or causal reasoning processes 
account for hindsight bias effects on event likelihood judgments. Nestler and Egloff 
(2009) found that providing explainable outcomes to surprise trivia questions moderated 
hindsight bias effects for outcome likelihood ratings (impressions of necessity/inevitable) 
but not for metacognitive assessments (impressions of foreseeability). These empirical 
findings therefore provide preliminary evidence that indicates that the hindsight bias in 
metacognitive assessments can best be explained by an expectation based anchoring and 
adjusting heuristic and the hindsight bias in situational judgment tasks can best be 
explained by causal reasoning or sense-making processes (Ash & Wiley, 2008; Ash, 
2009; Nester et al., 2008a, 2008b; Nestler & Egloff 2009). 
Experiment: Likelihood and Confidence Judgments 
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What is lacking in the hindsight bias literature is a direct empirical test 
demonstrating the independence of outcome likelihood and confidence judgment tasks. 
Therefore, the current experiment tested a non-unitary approach to modeling the 
hindsight biased based on Ash and Wiley (2008) against a unitary approach. To 
accomplish this, I used the text based scenario developed by Ash (2009). This scenario 
was designed for testing differing predictions of outcome congruency on hindsight effects 
within a case-study or narrative text paradigm. The scenario and research design allows 
one to test competing models of hindsight bias in a single domain where the information 
available to a participant at the points of prediction and retrospection can be controlled. 
As noted by Ash (2009), one way in which CR theories differ is in the proposed 
effect of expectation or the surprising nature of an outcome on the hindsight bias. To 
manipulate surprise, participants were asked to read a story describing an upcoming 
tennis match between two players. The story described the strengths and weaknesses of 
each player. An equated version of the text was created that presented equal amounts of 
evidence to support each players' victory. From this equated text, an outcome-supporting 
version for each player was developed by removing pieces of evidence that supported the 
other tennis player's victory. When these introductory texts are combined with the two 
possible outcomes, it leads to three types of outcome conditions: Congruent (where the 
outcome matched that supported by the story), Ambivalent (either outcome matched with 
the equated story), and Incongruent (where the outcome was the opposite of that 
supported by the story). In this paradigm, when preoutcome information (the introductory 
text) is congruent with the outcome (who won the match), it is an expected or 
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unsurprising outcome. However, when preoutcome information is incongruent with the 
outcome, this is called an unexpected or surprising outcome. 
For the procedure, participants first read the introductory story. Then, they were 
asked to rate the likelihood of the two possible outcomes on a continuum anchored on 
each player's victory. Then they read a passage describing who won and then rated how 
surprising they found the outcome. Finally, participants returned to the lab a week later 
and attempted to recall their original predictions. The hindsight bias in this paradigm 
would be observed if retrospective judgments would be systematically biased toward the 
given outcome. 
Using this paradigm, based on the non-unitary approach of Ash and Wiley (2008) 
and Ash (2009), a judgment type (metacognitive confidence assessment vs. situational 
likelihood rating) by outcome congruency (incongruent, congruent) interaction on 
hindsight results is predicted. Sense making theories are predicted to provide the most 
plausible explanation of hindsight findings for situational judgments and the expectation-
based adjustment model to provide the most plausible explanation for hindsight findings 
on metacognitive judgments. Therefore, for situational judgment tasks, sense-making 
theories predict the most hindsight bias after surprising outcomes, because surprising 
situations will activate the sense-making processes leading to a biased, updated 
representation that will be used during retrospective judgment making. For metacognitive 
judgments, expectation based adjustment models predict that the most hindsight bias 
should occur on expected outcomes because these outcomes will be the most likely to 
elicit the "I would have known that!" feeling that leads to overly-adjusted retrospective 
judgments. 
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However, a unitary approach to modeling hindsight findings predicts no judgment 
type by outcome congruency interaction on hindsight results. In this unitary approach, 
sense making theories predict the occurrence of the hindsight bias only in the incongruent 
outcome condition regardless of the judgment task. In a similar fashion, expectation 
based adjustment models predict the occurrence of the hindsight bias only in the 
congruent outcome condition for both situational judgments and metacognitive 
assessments. 
In sum, if likelihood and confidence judgments are indeed separate tasks 
governed by differing cognitive processes, the sense making theories would best predict 
hindsight bias findings resulting from situational likelihood judgment tasks and 
expectation-based adjustment models would best predict hindsight bias findings from 
metacognitive confidence assessments. Patterns of the hindsight bias would therefore 
differ according to which judgment task is completed. Metacognitive assessments would 
show hindsight effects only in an outcome congruent condition while situational 
judgments would show hindsight effects only in an outcome incongruent condition. 
However, if these judgment tasks are not independent, then no differences in the pattern 
of hindsight bias findings between judgment tasks will be observed, thus supporting 
predictions based on a unitary explanation for modeling hindsight effects. Table 1 
illustrates the judgment type by outcome congruency hindsight predictions for the unitary 




HB predictions HB predictions 
Judgment Tasks Non-Unitary Theory Incongrnent Congruent 
Metacognitive Expectation-based NoHSB HSB 
Situational Sense making HSB NoHSB 
Judgment Tasks Unitary Theory Incongruent Congruent 
Metacognitive Expectation based NoHSB, HB 
Metacognitive Sense making HB NoHSB 
Situational Expectation based NoHSB, HB 
Situational Sense making HB NoHSB 
Note. The Unitary versus Non-Unitary predictions of hindsight efifects by judgment type 





Based on the average hindsight bias effect sizes reported in meta-analyses 
(Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway & Posavac, 
2004) and the Ash (2009) experiments, between 40 (Cohen's d = .4) and 68 (Cohen's d = 
.3) participants were needed in each congruency experimental conditions (Congruent and 
Incongruent outcome conditions) in order to test for the moderation effects of judgment 
type by outcome congruency on hindsight effects proposed by the different hindsight bias 
theories. Two hundred fifty four introductory psychology students from Old Dominion 
University participated in both sessions of this study for course credit (72.4% women; M 
age = 21.44 years, SD = 6.46 years; Range = 18-54 years; 95.7% native English 
speakers). Table 2 illustrates the proposed and obtained sample size per condition. 
Table 2 
Condition N Sizes 
Tennis Match Preoutcome Outcome information Proposed Obtained 
information N N 
Congruent Krause supporting Krause wins 30 32 
Mitchell supporting Mitchell wins 30 31 
Incongruent Krause supporting Mitchell wins 30 30 
Mitchell supporting Krause wins 30 30 
Job Promotion 
Congruent Keller supporting Kellar wins 30 32 
Davidson supporting Davidson wins 30 33 
Incongruent Keller supporting Davidson wins 30 33 
Davidson supporting Kellar wins 30 33 
Note. Design of Preoutcome and Outcome Information Congruency Manipulation with 
Sample Sizes by Text Scenario. 
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Materials 
Two narrative stories were used in this experiment, one utilized in Ash (2009) 
which describes a tennis match and one I have developed and piloted that describes a job 
promotion. Ash (2009) used a pre-outcome narrative text that described an upcoming 
championship tennis match between two fictional players, Mark Krause and Nathan 
Mitchell. The story was designed to equate the amount of causal information in the text 
that supported either player's victory. Appendix A contains the tennis match text and 
illustrates which sentences, if deleted, provide support for an outcome that favors either 
Krause or Mitchell. Two outcome information texts were created for the story. These 
texts were designed to inform the participant as to the outcome of the text, with either a 
"Krause Wins" outcome or a "Mitchell Wins" outcome. 
The narrative story I created utilizes a narrative text with the domain of a job 
promotion as the subject matter of the story and predictions of who will get the 
promotion as the judgment domain. This manipulation will serve to help show whether 
the idea that patterns of the hindsight bias differ according to judgment tasks is a robust 
explanation of the hindsight bias effect across differing domains. As in the tennis match 
story, the job promotion story was designed to equate the amount of causal information in 
the text that supported either businessman's successful promotion, either Jeffrey Keller or 
Michael Davidson. Also, two outcome information texts were created for this story, 
informing the participant as to either a "Keller got the promotion" outcome or a 
"Davidson got the promotion" outcome. Appendix B contains the job promotion 
narrative text. 
Design and Procedure 
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Participants were randomly assigned to either the tennis match or job promotion 
story. For either story, participants were randomized to one of eight story orders to 
control for order effects. An E-Prime application running on laboratory computers 
presented all directions, experimental materials, and questions as well as collected all 
participant responses. 
The narrative protocol used in Ash (2009) was closely replicated for both stories; 
differing in that participants were randomly assigned to either a pre-outcome 
metacognitive assessment task condition or a pre-outcome event likelihood (situational) 
judgment task condition. The experiment consisted of two sessions that took place 
exactly 1 week apart. The first session involved two main phases: a practice phase and an 
experimental phase. Participants were told that they are participating in a study on 
reading comprehension in which they will be asked to read stories and answer opinion 
questions about the stories. The practice phase involved a reading task, rating tutorial, 
and rating tasks. Participants first read a practice story and then they read a short tutorial 
which described the rating procedure. They then answered questions about the likelihood 
of two possible outcomes using the same procedure as in the experimental phase. The 
experimental phase occurred directly after the practice phase and involved the pre-
outcome information reading task, pre-outcome metacognitive confidence rating or event 
likelihood rating, outcome information reading task, and post-outcome surprise rating. 
For the experimental phase, participants were randomly assigned to a pre-
outcome scenario (i.e. a Krause supporting or Mitchell supporting text). Participants were 
also randomly assigned to which outcome text they received (Krause Wins or Mitchell 
Wins). The combination of the pre-outcome and outcome texts resulted in two 
25 
information-outcome congruency conditions (Congruent and Incongruent). The pre-
outcome text and the outcome text were presented via a self-paced reading paradigm. 
Each sentence of the text was presented on the screen one at a time with participants 
advancing through the text by pressing the space bar. Directly after reading the pre-
outcome text, participants were asked to either make a metacognitive assessment or an 
event likelihood rating of the two possible outcomes. Specifically, for the metacognitive 
assessment, participants were asked "How confident are you in predicting who will win 
the job promotion/tennis match? Use the scale below to indicate your opinion of how 
confident you are in your ability to predict who will win." Below the metacognitive 
question, a confidence rating was flanked by anchors of "not at all confident" and "very 
confident". For the event likelihood rating, participants were asked "Either Mark 
Krause/Jeffrey Kellar won the match OR Michael Davidson/Nathan Mitchell won the 
promotion/match. Use the scale below to indicate your opinion of how likely the two 
outcomes are based on the story." Below the event likelihood question, a continuum that 
is flanked on either side by "Kellar/Krause Wins" and "Davidson/Mitchell Wins" was 
presented. For both the confidence and event likelihood rating, the continuum was 
initially blank. However, after reading the question, when participants press the space bar 
a marker appears at a random location somewhere in the middle third of the scale. 
Participant then indicate their response by moving the marker on the scale between the 
two possible outcomes. The continuum allows for 79 possible marker locations. 
Participants are able to move the marker along the scale by pressing the 1 key to move 
left or the 3 key to move right. Each press moves the marker one space on the scale. 
Participants press the Enter key to indicate their final response. The program accepts a 
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response only if the marker moves at least once. This measure serves as the predictive 
judgments used to test whether the information congruency manipulation affects 
participants' outcome expectation and as the within-subjects comparison for hindsight 
bias observations. 
To assess post-outcome surprise, immediately after reading the outcome 
information, participants were asked, "How surprising was it that [outcome]?" Depending 
on the outcome condition, "[outcome]" is replaced by either "Jeffrey Kellar/Mark Krause 
won the promotion/match" or "Michael Davidson/Nathan Mitchell won the 
promotion/match." Participants then rated their surprise by using the same procedure as 
the other ratings, differing in that for this measure the continuum is anchored by "Not at 
all surprising" and "Very surprising". This measure serves as the surprise rating that is 
used to test whether the information-outcome congruency manipulation affected 
participants' subjective reaction to the outcome. This surprise rating concluded the 
session 1 experimental phase. After completing this rating all participants were asked not 
to discuss the text they read or the questions they were asked with anyone in the subject 
pool (including other participants in their group) and were dismissed. 
In the second session one week later, participants completed a post-outcome 
memory-rating task, which asked them to attempt to recall their pre-outcome confidence 
rating or likelihood rating. They were presented with the following directions: "Your task 
is to attempt to remember your answer to each of the questions from last week's session. 
To do this you will move the marker into the SAME position on the rating line as you put 
it during last week's session. Remember your goal is to try to reproduce your original 
ratings from last week's session. You will do this by moving a marker on a scale in the 
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same manner as last week. Pressing the 1 KEY will move the marker to the LEFT. 
Pressing the 3 KEY will move the marker to the RIGHT. When the marker is at the same 
position as it was on the question asked last week, press ENTER to record your response. 
Please try your best at remembering your rating from last week on each of the questions." 
The participants, according to which judgment type condition they were randomly 
assigned to in session 1, were then presented either the pre-outcome confidence rating 
question or pre-outcome likelihood rating question. The post-outcome memory rating 
served as the measure of the participants' retrospective judgments. Then, upon 
completion of the memory ratings, participants were debriefed as to the purpose of the 
study and reminded not to speak with anyone about the materials or questions appearing 




Preoutcome Predictive Judgment Ratings 
In order to test the effects of expectation on hindsight bias effects, the 
manipulation of preoutcome information must affect participants' predictive judgments 
of the given outcome. People should judge the given outcome, which is the outcome they 
are about to receive, as most expected in the Congruent condition and least expected in 
the Incongruent condition. For analysis, preoutcome predictive ratings were centered on 
the middle value of the rating continuum (range = -39 to 39) and recoded in order for 
positive scores to represent judgments in favor of the given outcome and negative scores 
to represent judgments in favor of the alternative outcome. Then to investigate the effects 
of the story bias manipulation on predictive judgments, I performed a 2 (judgment task: 
metacognitive vs. situational) X 2 (outcome congruency: incongruent vs. congruent) X 2 
(text: tennis match vs. job promotion) factorial ANOVA on mean predictive judgments. 
Result indicate a significant difference between the congruent and incongruent groups, 
F( 1, 246) = 76.87, p < .001, partial = .238. Additionally, I performed planned one-
sample t tests against a population mean of zero which revealed that participants in the 
Congruent condition favored the given outcome (M= 8.23, SD = 15.50), /(127) = 6.01, p 
< .001, Cohen's d = 0.531; those in the Incongruent condition favored the alternative 
outcome (A/= -9.52, SD = 17.30), /(125) = -6.17,< .001, Cohen's d= 0.550. These 
analyses show that the information manipulation designed to bias the story toward the 
different outcomes had a significant effect on participants' predictive judgments. 
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A note should also be made that analyses also indicated a significant judgment 
type X outcome congruency interaction, F( 1, 246) = 13.67,p < .001, partial = .053. 
However, simple effect comparisons of the judgment type X outcome congruency 
interaction for predictive ratings indicated non cross-over interactions. For metacognitive 
assessments, the simple effect test of outcome congruency indicated that predictive 
ratings differ across congruency conditions, F( 1,246) = 12.95, p < .001, partial = 
.050. The same effect was found for situational judgments, F(1, 246) = 77.09, p < .001, 
partial = .239. In comparison to the congruency conditions for the metacognitive 
assessments (Incongruent: M= -5.56, SD =14.50; Congruent: M=4.85, SD = 13.65), the 
situational judgments had greater predictive ratings in both the Congruent condition (M = 
11.71, SD = 16.60) and the Incongruent condition (M = -13.48, SD- 18.62). Non cross­
over interactions, or quantitative interactions, occur when there is variation in the 
magnitude, but not in the direction, of treatment effects among subsets (Gail & Simon, 
1985). Therefore, the non cross-over interactions did not confound any manipulation 
effect. Supporting this are the results which indicate that the outcome congruency 
manipulation had a significant effect for all intended subsets. 
Surprise Ratings 
To test the design assumption that the manipulation of preoutcome information 
also affected how surprising participants found the outcome information, I conducted a 2 
(judgment task: metacognitive vs. situational) X 2 (outcome congruency: incongruent vs. 
congruent) X 2 (text: tennis match vs. job promotion) factorial ANOVA on mean 
postoutcome surprise ratings (possible range: 1 = not at all surprising to 79 = very 
surprising). Results indicated a significant difference in surprise ratings between 
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congruency groups, with Incongruent outcomes (M= 46.48, SD = 20.25) being 
significantly more surprising than Congruent outcomes (M= 13.03, SD = 12.75), F( 1, 
246) = 255.93,p < .001, partial = .510. 
This main effect was subsumed under a significant text X outcome congruency 
interaction, F(l, 246) = 10.48, p = .001, partial = .041, as well as a significant 
judgment task X outcome congruency interaction, F(1,246) = 5.00, p = .026, partial = 
.020. However, simple effect comparisons of the interactions indicated significant non 
cross-over interactions that did not confound any manipulation effect. For the tennis 
match the simple effect test of outcome congruency indicated that surprise ratings differ 
across congruency conditions, F(l, 246) = 191.06, p < .001, partial = .437. The same 
effect was found for the job promotion text, F( 1, 246) = 78.91 ,p <.001, partial = .243. 
Therefore, in comparison to the congruency conditions in the tennis match, the job 
promotion text had a smaller surprise rating for the Congruent condition and a larger 
surprise rating in the Incongruent condition. For metacognitive assessments, the simple 
effect test of outcome congruency indicated that surprise ratings differ across congruency 
conditions, F(l, 246) = 167.55, p < .001, partial = .405. The same effect was found for 
situational judgments, F(l, 246) = 93.95,/? < .001, partial = .276. Therefore, in 
comparison to the congruency conditions for the metacognitive assessments, the 
situational judgments had a larger surprise rating for the Congruent condition and a 
smaller surprise rating in the Incongruent condition. In summary, these analyses 
demonstrate that the outcome congruency manipulation had a significant effect on 
participants1 subjective (surprise) reactions to the outcome information. See Figure 1 for 
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Figure 1. Mean surprise ratings as a function of text, judgment task, and outcome 
congruency condition. Error bars represent standard error of each mean. 
Hindsight Bias 
In order to investigate the effects of judgment task and outcome congruency on 
hindsight effects, a 2 (judgment: predictive vs. retrospective judgment) X 2 (judgment 
task: metacognitive vs. situational) X 2 (outcome congruency: incongruent vs. congruent) 
X 2 (text: tennis match vs. job promotion) split-plot ANOVA was conducted on judgment 
ratings. Driven by the non cross-over interaction of the predictive ratings that were 
described earlier, results revealed a significant text X outcome congruency interaction for 
the averaged judgment ratings, F(1, 246) = 5.15,p = .024, partial = .021. Again, 
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simple effect tests indicated this interaction to be a non cross-over interaction. Figure 2 
displays the hindsight bias patterns for the tennis match and Figure 3 displays the 
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Figure 2. Hindsight bias results: mean predictive and retrospective judgments as a 
function of judgment task, preoutcome, and outcome congruency condition for tennis 
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Figure 3. Hindsight bias results: mean predictive and retrospective judgments as a 
function of judgment task, preoutcome, and outcome congruency condition for job 
promotion text. Error bars represent standard error of each mean. 
More importantly, results revealed a main effect of judgment which demonstrated 
the traditional hindsight bias effect, F(l, 246) = 7.23,p = .008, Cohen's d= -0.241. 
Participants' retrospective judgments were more in favor of the given outcome (M =3.19, 
SD = 21.27) than their predictive judgments (M= -0.57, SD - 18.64). However, where 
the theories differ in their hindsight bias predictions is in the judgment (predictive vs. 
retrospective) X judgment task (metacognitive vs. situational) X outcome congruency 
(incongruent vs. congruent) interaction (See Table 2). The judgment X judgment task X 
outcome congruency interaction was significant, F(l, 246) = 14.35, p < .001, partial = 
.055. 
Planned follow up comparisons were conducted to examine judgment X outcome 
congruency interactions separately for the metacognitive and situational judgments. For 
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metacognitive judgments, the judgment X outcome congruency interaction was 
significant, F(1,246) = 10.40, p = .001, partial = .040 with further comparisons 
between congruency conditions providing evidence for the hindsight bias effect in the 
Congruent condition, F( 1, 246) = 9.55, p = .002, Cohen's d = .492 but not in the 
Incongruent condition, F(l, 246) = 2.20,p = .139, Cohen's d = .254. The opposite 
hindsight bias pattern was revealed within the situational judgment task. For situational 
judgments, the judgment X outcome congruency interaction was also significant, F( 1, 
246) = 4.55, p = .033, partial =.018, with further comparisons between congruency 
conditions providing evidence for the hindsight bias effect in the Incongruent condition, 
F(l, 246) = 11.64, p < .001, Cohen's d= .493 but not in the Congruent condition, F(l, 




Using a within-subjects, narrative text paradigm, the current experiment 
investigated if confidence ratings and outcome likelihood judgments are susceptible to 
unique patterns of hindsight bias. Based on the non-unitary approach of Ash and Wiley 
(2008) and Ash (2009), a predicted judgment type by outcome congruency interaction on 
hindsight bias effects was tested. This interaction prediction specified that unexpected 
outcome information would produce hindsight bias effects for situational (outcome 
likelihood) judgments and expected outcome information would produce hindsight bias 
effects for metacognitive (confidence) judgments. Findings confirmed this predicted 
interaction with situational and metacognitive judgments producing divergent patterns of 
hindsight bias; suggesting these tasks to be independent and governed by differing 
cognitive processes. 
The proposed non-unitary approach models situational judgments and 
metacognitive assessments as utilizing different problem representations and 
restructuring cues, which activate different judgment formation processes. Due to these 
task and processing differences, the theories and models required to explain hindsight 
bias patterns must be unique to each judgment task. The results of this experiment are 
consistent with the proposed non-unitary hindsight bias approach. For the situational 
judgment task, sense-making theories accurately predicted the hindsight bias to occur 
after unexpected outcomes. Sense-making theories attribute the occurrence of the bias to 
the unexpected outcome (i.e. a surprising situation) activating sense-making processes 
that led to a biased, updated representation being used during retrospective judgment 
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making. For the metacognitive assessment task, expectation based adjustment models 
accurately predicted the hindsight bias to occur after expected outcomes. Expectation 
based adjustment models attribute the bias to the expected outcome eliciting an "I would 
have known that!" feeling which led to an overconfident, over-adjusted, retrospective 
judgment. 
This experiment provides a direct empirical test of the independence of hindsight 
bias patterns between situational (outcome likelihood) and metacognitive (confidence) 
judgments; replicating, complementing, and extending previous hindsight research that 
has suggested these tasks to have unique qualities (Ash & Wiley, 2008; Ash, 2009; Blank 
et al., 2008; Nestler & Egloff, 2009). For example, in addition to finding empirical 
support for the non-unitary hindsight predictions of Ash and Wiley (2008) and Ash 
(2009), this experiment expanded the narrative text stimuli used in Ash (2009) to include 
a job promotion story. This addition shows the generalizability of the patterns of 
hindsight effects of the judgment tasks across different story content domains. This 
experiment also replicates and extends the hindsight findings in Nestler and Egloff (2009) 
while utilizing a different design and materials. In Nestler and Egloff (2009) a between-
subjects, trivia question paradigm produced findings that confirmed predictions of 1) 
sense-making or causal modeling theories to accurately account for hindsight patterns for 
the surprising outcome likelihood ratings and 2) outcome likelihood ratings and 
metacognitive assessments to display different hindsight patterns. By replicating these 
findings, the methodology used in this experiment provided evidence to extend the 
generalizability of these findings to a within-subjects, narrative scenario paradigm. 
Furthermore, additional design elements in this experiment allowed for more 
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comprehensive empirical examinations of the cognitive processes responsible for the 
differing hindsight patterns. For one, the manipulation of story outcomes allowed for the 
analysis of both expected (unsurprising) and unexpected (surprising) outcomes. This 
added manipulation allowed for the predictions of the "I would have known that!" 
hindsight bias theories to be tested in this experiment. These predictions were unable to 
be tested in Nester and EglofF(2009) as they only utilized surprising outcomes. Secondly, 
surprise was experimentally manipulated in this experiment through random assignment 
to outcome congruency conditions. Nestler and EglofF (2009) did not experimentally 
manipulate the inducement of surprise, but alternatively relied on the sample's prior 
knowledge of the plausibility of trivia questions to elicit surprise. Not experimentally 
manipulating surprise potentially weakens the accuracy of their proposed generalized 
causal inference of the relationship between surprising events and hindsight effects 
(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). 
In addition to complementing previous hindsight research, this study also 
provides unique empirical and theoretical contributions. While other non-unitary theories 
have attempted to account for the different "hindsight experiences", the non-unitary 
approach tested in this experiment is unique in that it is the only approach to propose a 
model of the hindsight bias that differentiates between judgment tasks according to how 
mental representations influence the judgment formation and reconstruction processes. 
The results of this experiment provide strong support for the proposition that some of the 
opposing predictions and conflicting findings in the hindsight bias literature may be a 
symptom of researchers not separating judgment tasks according to the cognitive 
processes that are unique to each task. 
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Based on the findings of the current investigation, modifications to current CR 
approaches of modeling hindsight bias effects are necessary. While previous CR models 
have focused their attention on modeling the judgment formation mechanisms, 
improvements can be achieved if they 1) account for the mental representation of the 
judgment task and 2) differentiate between the judgment tasks (and the resulting 
hindsight effects) the theory intends to model. The proposed non-unitary approach 
investigated here has attempted to integrate these improvements by incorporating the 
conceptualizations that 1) different judgment tasks rely on different mental 
representations, 2) mental representations are updated in different ways using different 
cues, and 3) people formulate retrospective judgments differently according to the 
representation and updating processes. 
Despite providing strong evidence for this alternative non-unitary approach to 
modeling hindsight bias effects, limitations are present. For one, this is only one 
experiment. Multiple replications as well as greater theoretical expansions are needed to 
fully conceptualized and validate this approach. Additionally, researchers have noted that 
the procedural differences between within-subjects/memory design and between-
subjects/hypothetical design paradigms may lead to qualitatively different hindsight 
effects (Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Hoflrage, 1997; Pohl, 2007). In a memory design, 
participants first make predictive judgments and then are asked to recall those judgments 
after they receive outcome information. Predictive and retrospective judgments are 
compared within-subjects to investigate evidence of the hindsight bias effect. In a 
hypothetical design, participants are fist given outcome information and then are asked to 
ignore the outcome and make the predictive judgment as they would have made had they 
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not learned the outcome. In this design, retrospective judgments are compared between-
subjects with a group that had made a predictive judgment without outcome information. 
As mentioned earlier, while the within-subjects design of this experiment and the 
between subjects design of Nestler and Egloss (2009) produced similar hindsight patterns 
for surprising outcome likelihood judgments, future research needs to examine if the 
hindsight patterns of the confidence ratings as well as the unsurprising outcome 
likelihood judgments demonstrated in this experiment generalize to a between subjects 
design. 
The results from this investigation support a non-unitary approach to 
understanding and investigating the hindsight bias phenomenon that integrates ideas 
across different literatures and can help explain some of the inconsistencies and 
anomalies in the hindsight bias literature. These findings can be used to build upon the 
great theoretical advancements in the field to date and offer potentially fruitful research 
directions for the future. For example, this non-unitary approach is able to generate 
unique, testable predictions involving the representational and judgment formation 
differences between judgment tasks. For instance, the Motivated Sense-Making model 
developed by Pezzo et al. (2007) would predict no hindsight bias in conditions of high 
self-relevance conditions and hindsight bias in low self-relevance conditions, regardless 
of judgment type. However, this non-unitary approach would predict different patterns of 
hindsight bias on situational and metacognitive judgments regardless of the self-relevance 
of the judgment. 
I believe that many of the different hindsight bias theories that have been 
proposed offer important insights into the causes of hindsight bias effects specifically, 
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and the processes by which people represent information and formulate judgments in 
general. Based on this proposed non-unitary approach, theories of hindsight bias that 
have previously been viewed as competing accounts of a single psychological 
phenomenon may actually prove to be complimentary explanations of retrospective 
judgment effects in qualitatively different domains. Based on the current investigation, 
sense-making theories and expectation based adjustment theories may be just two sides of 
the same coin; the former accounting for hindsight bias effects on situational judgments 
and the latter accounting for hindsight bias effects on metacognitive assessments. 
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THE CHAMPIONSHIP TENNIS MATCH 
Preoutcome information text: With all sentences included, this is the Equated Support 
version. With boldfaced sentences removed, it becomes the Krause Supporting version, 
and with underlined sentences removed, it becomes the Mitchell Supporting version. The 
story is divided into three parts. Within each part, the sentences with Krause or Mitchell 
as the subject were counterbalanced to control for order effects. Sentence labels: S = 
setting; K = Krause as subject; 
M = Mitchell as subject; KO = Krause outcome; MO = Mitchell outcome. Numbering 
reflects the proposed matched causal antecedence for each outcome. 
Part 1 
51. The final tennis match of the Australian open pitted two very noteworthy players 
against each other. 
K1. The player who was starting on the north side of the court was Mark Krause from 
Germany. 
K2. Krause was a 39-year-old, well-respected veteran tennis player. 
K3. That year, Krause had staged the comeback of the decade. 
K4. In his younger years he was consistently a top ranked world champion. 
K5. Krause was an experienced player who had trained hard to get back at the top of his 
game. 
K6. His hard training had helped him move up to 5th in the international rankings. 
K7. However, at his age, Krause was thought by many critics to be well past his 
prime. 
Ml. The player who was starting out on the south side of the court was Nathan Mitchell 
of the United Kingdom. 
M2. Mitchell was a 19-year-old tennis prodigy. 
M3. That year, Mitchell had been considered one of the most promising new players. 
M4. At the previous year's Olympics, he had earned a gold medal in the singles 
competition. 
M5. Mitchell was an ambitious young player who was a natural athlete. 
M6. This athletic ability had led him to be ranked 6th internationally. 
M7. However, many critics have pointed out that, at his age, he still lacked the 
experience of many of the other top ranked plavers. 
Part 2 
52. Both players had different strengths and weaknesses. 
K8. Krause was known for his rocket of a first serve. 
K9. He was nicknamed "Ace." because he had been known to complete entire matches 
without losing a single point on his serve. 
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KIO. Krause had developed a distinct patient style of play, where he focused on returning 
all volleys and waited for the opponent to make the mistake. 
Kll. However, this patient style sometimes worked against him, because the long 
matches often ended up wearing him out earlier than his younger opponents. 
M8. Mitchell had been praised for his amazing two-handed backhand. 
M9. His fast and accurate backhand rifled cross-court shots that even his quickest 
opponents had trouble returning. 
M10. Mitchell was known for his aggressive style, where he would often move up to the 
net and quickly return each volley at high speeds and sharp angles. 
Mil .  However ,  in  past  matches his  tendency to  move toward the net  too ear ly  had lef t  
him unprepared for the strategic lobs and baseline shots of his more experienced 
opponents. 
Part 3 
53. The wind was calm on the day of the match. 
K12. Experts predicted the lack of wind would be a definite advantage for Krause. 
because there would be nothing to disrupt his legendary serves to the younger Mitchell. 
54. The weather on the day of the match was a balmy 93 degrees. 
M12. Experts predicted that the hot weather would be a definite advantage for 
Mitchell, because the heat would surely have a greater detrimental effect on the 
older Krause. 
55. The match was about to begin and a hush fell over the crowd. 
56. Tennis fens around the world tuned in to see who was going to win this important 
match. 
Outcome Krause 
501. The championship match of the Australian Open did not disappoint the fans. 
502. The match pitted two formidable competitors against each other. 
503. However, in the end there could only be one champion. 
K04. At the end of the match, Mark Krause from Germany proved victorious. 
K05. Krause defeated his opponent, Nathan Mitchell of Great Britain, in a decisive 
victory. 
K06. Krause's fens cheered wildly as he accepted his trophy as the Champion of the 
Australian Open. 
Outcome Mitchell 
501. The championship match of the Australian Open did not disappoint the fans. 
502. The match pitted two formidable competitors against each other. 
503. However, in the end there could only be one champion. 
M04. At the end of the match, Nathan Mitchell from Great Britain proved victorious. 
M05. Mitchell defeated his opponent, Mark Krause of Germany, in a decisive victory. 




THE JOB PROMOTION 
Preoutcome information text: With all sentences included, this is the Equated Support 
version. With boldfaced sentences removed, it becomes the Kellar Supporting version, 
and with underlined sentences removed, it becomes the Davidson Supporting version. 
The story is divided into three parts. Within each part, the sentences with Kellar or 
Davidson as the subject were counterbalanced to control for order effects. Sentence 
labels: S = setting; K = Kellar as subject; 
D = Davidson as subject; KO = Kellar outcome; DO = Davidson outcome. Numbering 
reflects the proposed matched causal antecedence for each outcome. 
Part 1 
51. The final round of interviews for a job promotion pitted two very noteworthy 
businessmen against each other. 
Kl .  The businessman who was scheduled for  the morning interview was Jeffrey Kel lar .  
K2. Kellar was a 64-year-old, well-respected businessman. 
K3. That year, Kellar had accomplished a marked increase in his sales profits compared 
to previous years. 
K4. In his younger years he was consistently a top ranked salesman. 
K5. Kellar was a savvy businessman who had worked hard to get back at the top of his 
game. 
K6. His hard work had helped him move up the ranks in his company's sales division. 
K7. However, at his age, Kellar was thought by many senior executives to be well 
past his prime. 
Dl.  The businessman who was scheduled for  the af ternoon interview was Michael  
Davidson. 
D2. Davidson was a 22-year-old business prodigy. 
D3. That year, Davidson had been considered one of the most promising new associates. 
D4. During the previous year, he had earned his company's top award for 
exemplary job performance. 
D5. Davidson was an ambitious young businessman who was a natural born salesman. 
D6. This ability had led him to be ranked by his supervisors as a top sales prospect. 
D7. However, many critics have pointed out that, at his age, he still lacked the experience 
of many of the older top ranked salesmen. 
Part 2 
52. Both businessmen had different strengths and weaknesses. 
K8. Kellar was known for his highly detailed sales pitch. 
K9. He was nicknamed "Old FaithfiiL" because he had never lost a single customer to a 
rival company. 
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K10. Kellar had developed a distinct selling style, where he impressed his customers with 
his product knowledge. 
Kll. However, this selling style sometimes worked against him, because his 
customers were sometimes bored with his overly time consuming conversations. 
D8. Davidson had been praised for his amazing knack at quickly closing a business 
deal. 
D9. His fast and deliberate sale pitch consistently hit the mark, setting him apart 
from his less successful colleagues. 
D10. Davidson was known for his aggressive business style; where he would often move 
on a sales deal quickly, preventing competing salesmen from presenting a counter offer. 
D11. However, in the past few business deals his tendency to close the deal too quickly 
had lead to poor customer satisfaction ratines. 
Part 3 
53. The first part of the interview consisted of a mock sales presentation to the 
company's executive board to illustrate the candidates' product knowledge. 
K12. Colleagues predicted the presentation would he a definite advantage for Kellar. 
because of his extensive product knowledge. 
54. The second part of the interview consisted of brief one-on-one interviews with 
specific executive board members. 
D12. Colleagues predicted that the brief interviews would be a definite advantage 
for Davidson, because the short time limit would surely have a greater detrimental 
effect on the overly wordy Kellar. 
55. The interview was about to begin. 
56. Colleagues from around the office gossiped as to who would get the promotion. 
Outcome Kellar 
501. The job promotion did not disappoint the employees. 
502. The interview pitted two formidable candidates against each other. 
503. However, in the end only one applicant could get the promotion. 
K04. At the end of the interview day, Jeffrey Kellar got the promotion. 
K05. Kellar was selected over his competition, Michael Davidson, in a unanimous 
decision. 
K06. Kellar's colleagues congratulated him as he graciously accepted his new 
promotion. 
Outcome Davidson 
501. The job promotion did not disappoint the employees. 
502. The interview pitted two formidable candidates against each other. 
503. However, in the end only one applicant could get the promotion. 
D04. At the end of the interview day, Michael Davidson got the promotion. 
DO5. Davidson was selected over his competition, Jeffrey Kellar, in a unanimous 
decision. 
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